Wieland Müller

Microtargeting and Voters’ Unawareness: Experimental Results [former title: Social Media and Democracy: Experimental Results] (with Freek van Gils and Jens Prüfer) link

For a policy brief, see here.

For a blog post on this paper by Jens Prüfer, see here.

A new approach to the analysis of cooperation under the shadow of the future: Theory and experimental evidence (with Melis Kartal) link

Overcoming negative ethnic sentiments: Short- and long-term effects of a narrative compassion intervention (with Melis Kartal, Christian Koch and Tomáš Miklánek) pdf

One change at a time: Of (dis)advantaged players in the prisoner‘s dilemma game (with Geoffrey Castillo and Julian Polzin)

Abstract: The vast majority of the literature with regards to cooperation in prisoner's dilemmas derives insights under symmetric conditions for subjects. But many social dilemmas in real-life are of asymmetric nature. By systematically varying the stage game payoffs of the repeated prisoner's dilemma one at a time and by comparing it to a symmetric benchmark game, we derive insights about cooperation under asymmetry. In contrast to stylized results and predictions based on indices from the literature, we observe a decrease of cooperation if the sum of cooperative payoffs is increased asymmetrically.

Consistency and stationarity of individual time preferences (with Shachar Kariv, Syngjoo Choi, Matthew Polisson and Dan Silverman)

Abstract: We report the results of experiments in which subjects make a series of intertemporal choices. The design of the experiments allows us to test for consistency with utility maximization using the Generalized Axiom of Revealed Preferences (GARP) as well as for stationarity of intertemporal choices at the individual level. We document heterogeneity of individual intertemporal choices with respect to patterns of demand behavior and levels of consistency with utility maximization. Our data suggest that inconsistency, per se, is quantitatively more important than any form of non-stationarity.

Gradualism in the field (with Melis Kartal and Sigma Samhita)

Abstract: In this study, we examine the effectiveness of incremental trust-building (`Gradual game') against an all-or-nothing approach (`Binary game') in a low-trust environment among language-based in-groups and out-groups in India. This study is notable as the novel attempt to explore gradualism within an intrinsically low-trust environment, as well as employing real-time repeated interactions amongst participants engaged in a trust game. Contrary to our expectations of higher trust within the in-group, our findings reveal relatively low levels of trust across both groups, with gradualism failing to nurture any trust, compared to the binary framework. Moreover, evidence of discrimination was found only in the Gradual game, not in the Binary game. Our results shed light on the limitations of gradualism as a mechanism for enhancing trust, despite its broad application in various settings.

Purified randomness: An experimental exploration of Harsanyi’s theory (with Philipp Külpmann and Alexander A. Wagner)

Abstract: Harsanyi’s (1973) purification theorem suggests that mixed-strategy Nash equilibria (MSNE) can often be interpreted as pure-strategy Bayesian Nash equilibria in a game with small private payoff perturbations. We test this idea experimentally by implementing a Bayesian game in which participants face individual-specific payoff shocks. Our study addresses three key questions: (i) Do participants employ pure-strategy cut-off rules, as required for purification? (ii) How do different levels of private payoff perturbations influence observed mixed-strategy frequencies? (iii) Are individual characteristics, such as cognitive skills, predictive of strategy choices? Using a within-subject experimental design with varying levels of perturbation, we analyze deviations from theoretical cut-off strategies and compare the observed behavior to the MSNE predictions. Our results reveal substantial heterogeneity in the adoption of cut-off strategies, with higher adherence among participants with stronger mathematical reasoning skills. These findings provide the first direct empirical test of Harsanyi’s purification idea and contribute to understanding its empirical validity in strategic interactions.

Who is more rational: groups or individuals? (with Víctor González-Jiménez)

Abstract: We use recently developed revealed-preference tests to check and compare the consistency of choices of individuals and groups with several models of choice under risk. Using a comprehensive design, we also analyze how individual preferences are aggregated when groups are formed and how group preferences influence individual decisions when groups are dissolved. We find that group decisions are more consistent than those of individuals by only a modest yet significant margin. While many subjects improve in a group, we also find that many subjects' decisions made after groups are dissolved are clearly of lower quality than those of their groups before. We provide evidence that preference aggregation in a group is consistent with a simple model in which, on average, the more rational group member has a higher decision weight than the less rational one.

Microtargeting, Voters’ Unawareness, and Democracy, Journal of Law, Economics, & Organization, 41, 2025, 634–653 (with Freek van Gils and Jens Prüfer) pdf

Cournot meets Bayes-Nash: A discontinuity in behavior in finitely repeated duopoly games, Games and Economic Behavior, 144, 2024, 1-12 (with Cedric Argenton and Radosveta Ivanova-Stenzel) pdf

Cooperation in indefinitely repeated games of strategic complements and substitutes, Journal of Economics Behavior and Organization, 188, 2021, 1191–1205 (with Ayse Mermer and Sigrid Suetens) pdf

Building Trust: The Costs and Benefits of Gradualism, Games and Economic Behavior, 130, 2021, 258–275 (with Melis Kartal and James Tremewan) pdf

“Though this be madness, yet there is method in’t.” A Counterfactual Analysis of Richard Wagner’s Tannhäuser, Music and Letters, 95(4), 2014, 584–602 (with Ilias Chrissochoidis, Heike Harmgart and Steffen Huck) pdf

Output Commitment through Product Bundling: Experimental Evidence, European Economic Review, 65, 2014, 164–180 (with Jeroen Hinloopen and Hans-Theo Normann) pdf

Who acts more like a game theorist? Group and individual play in a sequential market game and the effect of the time horizon, Games and Economic Behavior, 82, 2013, 658–674 (with Fangfang Tan) pdf [Appendix]

Who is (More) Rational? American Economic Review, 104(6), 2014, 1518–1550 (with Syngjoo Choi, Shachar Kariv and Dan Silverman) pdf [Appendix 1] [Appendix 2] [Appendix 3] [Appendix 4] [Appendix 5] [Appendix 6]

Taxation and market power, Canadian Journal of Economics, 47(1), 2014, 173–202 (with Kai A. Konrad and Florian Morath) pdf

Naked exclusion in the lab: The case of sequential contracting, Journal of Industrial Economics, 62(1), 2014, 137–166 (with Jan Boone and Sigrid Suetens) pdf

Framing Effects and Impatience: Evidence from a Large Scale Experiment, Journal of Economic Behavior and Organization 84(2), 2012, 701–711 (with Eline van der Heijden, Tobias Klein, and Jan Potters) pdf

Collusion in experimental Bertrand duopolies with convex costs: The role of cost asymmetry, International Journal of Industrial Organization 30(6), 2012, 508–517 (with Cédric Argenton) pdf

Bertrand competition with asymmetric costs: Experimental evidence, Economics Letters 117(1), 2012, 134–137 (with Jan Boone, María Jose Larraín Aylwin and Amrita Ray Chaudhuri) pdf [Appendix]

Allais for all: Revisiting the paradox in a large representative sample, Journal of Risk and Uncertainty, 44(3), 2012, 261–293 (with Steffen Huck) pdf

The distribution of harm in price-fixing cases, International Journal of Industrial Organization 30(2), 2012, 265–276 (with Jan Boone) pdf

Signaling without a common prior: Results on experimental equilibrium selection, Games and Economic Behavior 74(1), 2012, 102–119 (with Michalis Drouvelis and Alex Possajennikov) pdf

Collusion through price ceilings? In search of a focal-point effect, Journal of Economic Behavior and Organization 79(3), 2011, 291–302 (with Dirk Engelmann). pdf

Workaholics and Dropouts in Organizations, Journal of the European Economic Association 8(4), 2010, 717–743 (with Andrew Schotter). pdf

The Miracle as a Randomization Device: A Lesson from Richard Wagner’s Romantic Opera Tannhäuser und der Sängerkrieg auf Wartburg, Economics Letters 102(1), 2009, 33–35 (with Heike Harmgart and Steffen Huck) pdf

Oligopoly limit-pricing in the lab, Games and Economic Behavior 66(1), 2009, 373–393 (with Yossi Spiegel and Yaron Yehezkel) pdf

Job market signaling and screening: An experimental comparison, Games and Economic Behavior 64(1), 2008, 219–236 (with Dorothea Kübler and Hans-Theo Normann). pdf

The merger paradox and why aspiration levels let it fail in the laboratory, The Economic Journal 117(522), 2007, 1073–1095 (with Steffen Huck, Kai A. Konrad and Hans-Theo Normann). pdf

Conjectural variations and evolutionary stability in finite populations, Journal of Evolutionary Economics 17(1), 2007, 53–61 (with Hans-Theo Normann) pdf

Endogenous timing in duopoly: Experimental evidence, International Journal of Game Theory 34(3), 2006, 443–456 (with Miguel A. Fonseca and Hans-Theo Normann) pdf

Spatial Voting with Endogenous Timing, Journal of Institutional and Theoretical Economics 162(4), 2006, 557–570 (with Steffen Huck and Vicki Knoblauch). pdf

Endogenous preemption on both sides of a market, Economics Letters 93(1), 2006, 126–131 (with Werner Güth and Jan Potters) pdf

Noisy leadership: An experimental approach, Games and Economic Behavior 57(1), 2006, 37–62 (with Werner Güth and Yossi Spiegel). pdf

From Ultimatum to Nash Bargaining: Theory and experimental evidence, Experimental Economics 9(1), 2006, 17–33 (with Sven Fischer, Werner Güth, and Andreas Stiehler). pdf

Allowing for two production periods in the Cournot duopoly: Experimental evidence, Journal of Economic Behavior and Organization 60(1), 2006, 100–111. pdf

Conjectural variations and evolutionary stability: A rationale for consistency, Journal of Institutional and Theoretical Economics 161(3), 2005, 491–502 (with Hans-Theo Normann). pdf

Burning money and (pseudo) first-mover advantages: An experimental study on forward induction, Games and Economic Behavior 51(1), 2005, 109–127 (with Steffen Huck). pdf

Strategic Delegation in Experimental Markets, International Journal of Industrial Organization 22(4), 2004 561–574. (with Steffen Huck and Hans-Theo Normann). pdf

Profitable horizontal mergers without cost advantages: The role of internal organization, information, and market structure, Economica 71(284), 2004, 575–587 (with Steffen Huck and Kai A. Konrad). pdf

On the Profitability of Collusion in Location Games, Journal of Urban Economics54(3), 2003, 499–510. (with Steffen Huck and Vicki Knoblauch). pdf

Attitudes towards risk: An experiment, Metroeconomica, 54(1), 2003, 89–124. (with Jürgen Eichberger and Werner Güth) pdf

Merger and collusion in contests, Journal of Institutional and Theoretical Economics 158 (4), 2002, 563–575. (with Steffen Huck and Kai A. Konrad) pdf

Absent-minded drivers in the lab: Testing Gilboa’s model, International Game Theory Review, 4(4), 2002, 435–448. (with Steffen Huck) pdf

Simultaneous and sequential price competition in heterogeneous duopoly markets: Experimental evidence, International Journal of Industrial Organization 20(10), 2002, 1437–1460. (with Dorothea Kübler) pdf

Tax liability side equivalence in an experimental posted offer market, Southern Economic Journal 68(3), 2002, 672–682. (with Rainald Borck, Dirk Engelmann, and Hans-Theo Normann) pdf

To commit or not to commit: Endogenous timing in experimental duopoly markets, Games and Economic Behavior 38(2), 2002, 240–264. (with Steffen Huck and Hans-Theo Normann) pdf

The East End, the West End, and King’s Cross: On clustering in the four-player Hotelling game, Economic Inquiry 40(2), 2002, 231–240. (with Steffen Huck and Nick Vriend) pdf

Big fish eat small fish: On merger in Stackelberg markets, Economics Letters 73(2), 2001, 213–217. (with Steffen Huck and Kai A. Konrad) pdf

Why firms should care for customers, Economics Letters 72(1), 2001, 47–52. (with Manfred Königstein) pdf

Stackelberg beats Cournot: On collusion and efficiency in experimental markets, Economic Journal 111(474), 2001, 749–765. (with Steffen Huck and Hans-Theo Normann) pdf

The relevance of equal splits in ultimatum games, Games and Economic Behavior37(1), 2001, 161–169. (with Werner Güth and Steffen Huck) pdf

Divisionalization in contests, Economics Letters 70(1), 2001, 89–93. (with Steffen Huck and Kai A. Konrad) pdf

Strategies, heuristics, and the relevance of risk-aversion in a dynamic decision problem, Journal of Economic Psychology 22(4), 2001, 493–522. pdf

The quality of the signal matters: A note on imperfect observability and the timing of moves, Journal of Economic Behavior and Organization 45(1), 2001, 99–106. pdf

An experimental analysis of intertemporal allocation behavior, Experimental Economics 3(2), 2000, 137–152. (with Vital Anderhub, Werner Güth, and Martin Strobel) pdf

Why the rich are nastier than the poor: A note on the distribution of wealth when individuals care for payoff differentials, Kyklos 53(Fasc.2), 2000, 153–160. (with Steffen Huck) pdf

Combining rational choice and evolutionary dynamics: The indirect evolutionary approach, Metroeconomica 51(3), 2000, 235–256. (with Manfred Königstein) pdf

Perfect versus imperfect observability: An experimental test of Bagwell’s result, Games and Economic Behavior 31(2), 2000, 174–190. (with Steffen Huck) pdf